War and Peace

Leo Tolstoy, 1863-1869

**On permanent peace**

**On strategy, new science** 111

* How the Germans taught you (Andrei, son of Prince) to fight Bonaparte according to this *new* science you call strategy?
* Strategy = the way to fight.
* Response to this question was a plan. Force Prussia to force her abondon its neutrality and enter a war with 90K Russian force etc.

**Nature of man and Peace** 574

* Bible account of idleness, absence of toil before the Fall of man, is the source of absolute happiness. For earthly man this is impossible.
* Moral nature of man: unable to be idle and at peace. A secret voice warns us for idleness is sin.

**On military class** 574

* Still one class enjoy this unquestioned idleness: military. Attraction comes from this quality.
* Civil world is difficult and complex, Rostov doesnt want to go back to village, commander of cavalry company.

**On military science** 762-763

* There could be no military sciene, no such military genius. What theory and science is possible where the conditions and circumstances of a subject are unknown and cannot be defined- especially when the strength of the active forces engaged cannot be ascertained. Relative positions, and potentials are unknown.
* Brave sprited 5000 leads the way of cut-off with “hurrah” against 30K, Schön graben
* 50K will fly from 8K-Austerlitz
* What science can there be where eveything is vague and depends on endless variety of circumstances, the significance of which becomes manifest all in a moment, and no one can foretell when that moment is coming.
* Military genius is called like that because of the power with which the military are invested, writers flatters power and call these generals genius.
* The best generals Prince Andrei saw was stupid and absent-minded man. A ggo general has no need of special qualities, on the contrary he is better for absence of the loftiest and finest human attributes-lovei poetry, tenderness, philosophic and inquiring doubt. Theory of genius is invented for them because power on thier side.
* The success of military action depends not on them but on the man in the ranks who first shouts “we are lost” or “hurrah” and only in the ranks can one serve with assurance of being useful.

**Absolute Continuity of Motion** 974-5

* Absolute continuity of motion is not comprehensible to the human mind. Laws of motion of any kind become comprehensible to man only when he examines arbitrarily selected elements of that motion; but at the same time, a large proportion of human error comes from the arbitrary division of continuous motion into discontinuous elements.
* Movement of events are continuous not discrete.
* Branch of mathematics, having attained the art of reckoning with infinitesimals (Sonsuz küçük kemiyetler), can yield solution.
* We have to admit infinitesimal quantitiesand their progression up to a tenth, and taking the sum of that geometrical progression we solve the problem.
* Investigation of the laws of historical movement precisely the same principle operates.
* Revolution was not the result of Napoleon or some people will, but it was the sum of men’s individual wills produced both the Revolution and Napoleon.
* Decision of retreat is taken by the single moment, it was the result of subsequent events, finally it became to point of inevitable.

**Military critique** 979

* Learned critiques: one those sit back and talk, do not forget inevitable conditions, leave moscow and retreat to further back.
* Commander of n army, especially in critcal moments, has not one, but dozens of schemes proposed to him, each based on strategy and tactics and contradicting all the rest. Commander’s business seem to select one of those, but no. Events and time doesnt wait.
  + Proposal to withdraw to Kaluga, instead of Fili
  + Questions at the same time: Engage French or retreat?
  + Many battlefield decisions (medical, logistic) coincides
  + Prince expected, military best advice contradict
  + Recce reports all different

**Notion of victory** 1220

* The battle of Borodino and subsequent occupation of Moscow by France, without any engagement, is one of the most instructive phenomena inhistory.
* Historians point of view: external activities of states and peoples in their clashes with one another finds expression in wars; that political power of states and people increases or diminishes in proportion to success or defeat in war. An army defeats another, whole nation is subjugated, all Napoleon wars shows this.
* 1812 Borodino and fall of Moscow, however, shows vice versa. French gain victory, near Moscow, Moscow is taken, with no more battles, it was not Russia that ceases to exist, but the French army of 600K, AND Napoleonc France itself cesaed. To strecth the facts to fit the rules of history is impossible.

**Factor *x*** 1221-5

* The period of the campaign of 1812 from the battle of Borodino to the expulsion of the French proved that the winning of a battle does not produce a conquest and is not even an invariable indication of conquest; it proved that the force which decides the fate of peoples lies not in the conquerors, nor even in armies and battles, but in something else.1221
* People war on France won, they burn hay etc 1222
* One of the most obvious and advantageous departures from the so-called laws of war is the action of scattered groups against men pressed together in a mass. Guerilla warfare. 1812 de ruslar tarafından yapıldı. 1223
* That rule says that an attacker should concentrate his forces in order to be stronger than his opponent at the moment of conflict.
* Military science assumes the strength of army to be identical with its numerical proportions. Greater numbers greather stregth. *Les gros bataillons ont toujour raison*. God is on the side of the big batalions.
* This assertion is like defining energy in mechanics by reference to mass only. But momentum is product of both mass and velocity. So too in warfare the strength of an army is the product of its mass and of something else, some unknown factor *x*.
* Military science finding in history innumerable instances of the size of an army did not coinciding with its strength defeating larger onesi vaguely admits the existence of this ‘unknown’ and tries to discover it, in geometrical disposition of the troops, superority of weapons, or more frequently in the genious of the commenders. But none of these hypothetical identifications of the unknown factor yields results.
* IOT find this unknown, it is necessary to renounce the false notion of the efficacy of dispositions issued in war-time by the higher authorities. 1224
* This *x* is the spirit of the army, in other words, the greater or lesser readiness to fight and face danger, quite independently of whether they are or are not figthing under leader of genius, or formation, or with cudgel or rifle. Men who are eager to fight will always put themselves in the most adventageous conditions for fighting.
* The spirit of the army is the (unknown) factor which multiplied by the mass gives the resulting force. To define and formulate this unknown factor is scientific problem.
* The problem is only solvable if we stop arbitrarily substituting for the unknown *x* the conditions under which it is seen to operate – such as the dispositions of the general, the military equipment, an so on- mistaking these as unknown factor. We must accept it as the more or less active desire to fight and face danger. Only then, expressing the known historical facts by means of equations, shall we be able to compare the relative values of the unknown factor; only then may we hope to arrive at the unknown itself.
* If 10 men beats 15 (kills or prisoner) while losing 4, it means that 4 is equal to 15. 4x=15y, x is to y as 15 is to 4. This equation does not give us the **absolute value of the unknown factor**, it does give us the **ratio** between two unknowns. And, by putting a whole variety of historical data (battles, campaigns, periods of warfare and so on) into such form of equations, a series of figures will be obtained which must involve the laws inherent in equations and will in time reveal them.
* Thesis: Strength of army depends on its spirit. Unconscious confirmation comes from tactic: acting in messes on assult, in smaller groups in retreating. 1224-5
  + To lead men forward under fire requires more discipline.
  + But as the rule leaves out of account the spirit of the army, it continually proves fallacious. Especially in national wars, where strong rise and fall in the spirit of troops occurs. French retreat done in mess, whereas Russian assults on retreat were seperate in nature. Because spirit were high to get rid of invaders.
* Retreat of Grand Armee is treated withNapoleon’s masterly arrengements and deeply considered plans in history, and military genious of marshals, which was not the case. Historians do tihs to fit the event (retreat) into their theories. For us who have standard of good and evil given by Christ, nothing can claim to be outside of law. And there is no greatness where simpliciy, goodness, and truth are absent. 1266-1268

**Reliable sources - Data collection methodology**

* Discard the reports and plans of the generals and consider the movements of those hundreds of thousands man who took a direct plan in the events. All questions will be seen soluble then. Cutting of retreat of Napoleon never existed in reality axcept several individuals. It was impractible; 1270-1272
  + Coincidence of movement of the columns witihn 2-3 miles were impossible, with French army retreating hastly and half-perished russian army.
  + Paralysing the force of inertia of France requires larger force of Russia, which they lacks.
  + Cutting-off has no mean in military.
  + Chief reason: war was so brutal that Russians strained every nerve to the utmost in its pursuit. 50.000 perished in its march from Tarutino to Krasnoe. Logistics were worst.